

Chapter 1

Plural Security: Diverse Disciplines, Multiple Actors



Francesc Guillén Lasierra

Abstract The idea of security being an area of the unique competence of Police has always been a fallacy. The Hobbesian idea of the state monopoly of security has also been a myth. It has always been other actors coproducing security (or normative) with the state. Landlords and large companies have always procured security for their possessions and facilities, but even social institutions as the school, the church or the family have played an important role in monitoring people's conducts. Dynamics of modern societies with the fading or institutional social controls in a world with individual rights as a centre and an extremely high mobility make Police and the state unable to keep even the appearance of guaranteeing security by themselves. Several actors, public and private ones, are called to co-operate in order to provide with a sustainable security. This reality has a lot of implications. The kind of contribution of each actor should be coherent with the legal powers they have and what they can provide with. Legitimation of every actor does not come from the same source, since they have different interests: who should watch over the general one and lead the process? Getting an answer to that requires thorough analysis.

Keywords State monopoly · Transversal security · Legitimation · Public/private interest · Plural policing

1.1 The Illusion of the Almighty State: The Police (and the Army)

What we know as state (some call it “modern state”) has had as a preeminent quality the fact of holding an irresistible power, the highest power over the territory. Most

Although the concept used in Anglo-Saxon countries is “plural policing”, “plural security” provides with more clues about what's in. Furthermore, in non-Anglo-Saxon countries makes much more sense.

F. G. Lasierra (✉)
Head of Projects and Organisation, Department of Interior, Generalitat of Catalonia, Catalonia,
Spain
e-mail: fguillen@gencat.cat

authors have followed Hobbes' postulates (1651/1980) that justify this political structure by the fact of being able to make all people under its power follow its provisions (Shearing and Wood 2011). The only entity capable of avoiding the war of everybody against everybody, which was supposed to be the natural human tendency (Hobbes 1651/1980), although, in fact, previously to the state, security was assumed collectively (Baker 2008) in a much more stable and quiet scenario. The large and relatively fast process of urbanisation and industrialisation required more formal structures, strong and institutionalised. The old system could not cope with the new forms of crime and the quite frequent riots. This *absolute* power, or the *benign giant*, as some call it (Holley and Shearing 2017) was supposed to guarantee the safety of people within its territory, being able to tackle the new challenges. For this idea of state "the protection of its people from internal and external threats stands consequently as the first and defining priority of Government" (Loader and Walker 2007, Position No. 160). If it did not succeed, people had the right of rebellion. However, this almighty power of the state constituted not only a guarantee of security of individuals, but also a threat to it (Loader and Walker 2007, Position No. 160). Although, progressively, the absolute character of this power was being modulated towards an idea of check and balances and an area of freedom for citizens, the idea of the state as a structure capable of keeping safe its citizens was held as the main function of it (Shearing and Wood 2011), despite the shadows of unease that excessive state power had caused (Shearing and Wood 2011). Even under the theoretical rule of law, every time that there is a threat that is considered beyond *normality*, the idea of recovering that almighty power with scarce limits to its actions is back there. In this point, it is as if security cannot coexist with freedoms and only could be guaranteed by an unlimited power. It comes from both sides. First of all, politicians that raise that fear speech in order not only to get the attention of the most fearful ones, but to reduce notably the public scrutiny of their actions. Secondly, there is a notable sector of the public that, before serious attacks to societal life, tend to demand very severe measures, with high level of right's restrictions as if it was a solution for something.

If security is supposed to be a fundamental state function, then the main actors should be the Police and, collaterally, depending on the contexts and the circumstances, the Army. A clear evidence of that is that in English the term "security" has not had a great presence in this area of, let us say, *internal security*. The most used word has been "policing", in the assumption that security is what Police provide with. If you compare texts in English with texts in Spanish, French, Italian or German, you will notice that the correct interpretation of "policing" in those languages should be "security" (Guillén 2016).

Actually, we may well add the criminal justice system in which Police is one of the relevant actors, as concerned with security (or with crime). As soon as a crisis concerning security raises, the Police (in particular situations the Army too) and the criminal justice system are supposed to do something: being tougher, better equipped, new conducts established as crime, tougher penalties, etc. The Police were (even now they are) in charge of preventing children from school's absenteeism, because it was not considered as a social problem with several influencing actors but as the violation of a legal duty (children should be at school). So, it was a matter of policing, had

the Police resources and capacity to maintain it or not. If children had to work at an early age in order to support the mean salaries that their parents got, it was not a matter of security, not a matter of policing (obviously it is not) or a matter of the state. Security should be withheld by preventing the evil to break legal provisions, and it was a Police matter. So, Police were the first immediate mechanism to prevent school absenteeism.

1.2 Evolution of the Concept of Security

A core fact that affected the measures to be taken to maintain security was the evolution of what was considered as “security”. First of all, it was the physical security, the prevention of being physically attacked, robbed, injured or damaged in any way. This protection could be carried out by using any coercive means, and there were no limits to state intervention in order to guarantee citizen’s security. Gradually, this lack of control was also considered as an insecurity factor: if the state could use any means to guarantee your security, it could also affect your expectations about what the state should provide you with. So, for instance, the state could force you to stay at home or prevent you from doing no matter what activity and use coercion to enforce it. Consequently, “security” should include clear expectations about what the state could do (or not do) with you. It is important because “expectations” are not physical, but psychological. That change paved the way to a new concept of security where the personal and social factors started to be relevant, although it would take quite long to be assumed and conceptualised. So, to counteract this uncertainty, guarantees about what the state could do (and how) with its citizens were established. From then on, security included a framework in which the state should move in order to protect you from evil. It is true that, as abovementioned, before exceptional (negative) circumstances people have tended to accept state intervention outside of this regulated framework, bringing back some uncertainty about what you can expect from the state (Guantanamo is a paramount example). However, conceptually speaking, the need of this predictability has not been denied. Furthermore, unfairness of public actors (especially Police) has been a cause of insecurity, fear and public turmoil till now. Discriminatory and violent Police behaviour with members of minorities has constituted a true cause of fear among African Americans, emigrants from Latin America, Africa or Asia in Western countries. The very recent outbreak of the *black lives matter* movement has put on the table how biased and unfair state agent’s interventions may cause panic among the concerned public.

Some additional light about the true contents of security was brought up by crime victimisation surveys. In the second half of the twentieth century, both the American (Moore et al. 2019) and, afterwards, the British Crime Victimisation surveys showed how what people mentioned that made them feel unsafe were not always crime or direct attacks against them or their properties or rights (Guillén 2018; Killias 2010). Those surveys (and later all those that followed them everywhere) evidenced that people, quite often, felt unsafe when they faced what we could call “disordered

spaces”. Dirty places, with lack of light, or with no visibility from neighbour spaces, unknown people on the beat, noise, kids playing in places not thought for that or people drinking, singing or prowling, were mentioned by interviewees more often as cause of insecurity rather than serious crimes. Even interviewees manifested that they modified their conducts because of those circumstances, not carrying out activities that they had liked to do or taking protective measures despite of the fact that those mentioned circumstances might not imply any true risk for them (Guillén 2021).

This evidence shattered the traditional idea of tackling insecurity by the Police and the criminal justice system. The facts that people mentioned as cause of their insecurity could not, in most cases, be solved by Police or magistrate’s actions. The solution required the participation of several public and, sometimes, private actors. This reality facilitated the raising of new approaches to security that included multiple actors, with expertise in the perspectives to be taken into account, and the actions to be carried out. Maybe one of the best known perspective was the movement “Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design”, that at the beginning was quite centred in the urban design and, later on, included people, participation and the facilitation of certain urban activities that could foster conviviality and the peaceful use of public spaces (Van Soomeren 2001). The well-known Bonnemaison report in France¹ or the setting up of the European Forum for Urban Security advocated to build up more transversal and comprehensive responses to insecurity in cities. Very recently, even the current security approach in New York, as it will be mentioned later on, focuses primarily in substituting the former CompStat (based on Police crime statistics) by a NeighbourhoodStat (based on support networks established at the level of neighbourhood). It acknowledges that the increase of crime in the last third of the twentieth century in New York coincided with a period of growing unemployment, degradation of the middle class, concentrated poverty and reduction of social services (Glazer and Sharkey 2021).

This need to tackle the grounds that facilitate insecurity or crime is already a quite spread idea among the population. A survey carried out in the French city of Rennes at the beginning of 2021² has shown that the 77% of interviewees think that in order to combat insecurity it is necessary to reduce poverty and inequality. The 53% of respondents think that people in the most precarious situation are those with higher exposition to insecurity, and *only* the 47% think that security problems require mainly a repressive response. Concerning what the respondents consider to be the most serious challenges to be dealt with, 54% answer that it is the fight against poverty and precariousness, 53% answer that it is environment protection and climatic change, and 52% affirm that it is security. At the same time, when interviewees are asked for the reasons why insecurity grows in the city, 26% of them affirm that it is due to media reports, social networks information and stories been told

¹ Vid. <https://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/834037801.pdf>.

² Vid. https://metropole.rennes.fr/sites/default/files/inline-files/R7974%20VILLE%20DE%20RENNES%20Livre%20blanc%20de%20la%20s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9%20-%20R%C3%A9ultats%20de%20l'enqu%C3%AAt%20aupr%C3%A8s%20des%20Rennais-%20Mars%202021%20PRESENTATION%20ATELIER_0.pdf.

mouth to ear. So, although there is still a tendency to link insecurity with repressive measures, the idea of insecurity as a result of social disparities has even a slightly wider presence among interviewees. However, Kübler and de Maillard (2020) show us, with the results of their survey to mayors, that there is still a not negligible number of them that think that the repressive response (Police and criminal justice) is the most efficient to maintain and restore security.

1.3 The Deceit of State Monopoly of Security. The Myth of the Hobbesian Idea. The Paradox of Zero Tolerance Policing

It was obvious that even in the *old times*, when allegedly the state was the only and capable actor to guarantee security, family, religion, schools and social informal control played an estimable role. Parents and elder relatives, priests, teachers and neighbours took an active role in preventing and repressing deviated conducts through different ways. Punishments in and out home by those actors were quite common. Parents and teachers could even use physical punishment to prevent and repress deviation. However, the official speech never attributed them a role in keeping society safe. The idea of security being an area of the unique competence of Police has always been a widely accepted fallacy. Security is depending on such a wide array of factors that it is evident that other disciplines should be involved in maintaining it. There have always been other actors coproducing security (or normative behaviour in the wide sense) with the state (Baker 2008; Zender 2006). Landlords and large companies have always procured security for their possessions and facilities, but even social institutions as the school, the church or the family have played an important role in monitoring people conducts, making order more feasible. Some professionals have also been charged with formal security responsibilities (teachers, doctors, jewellery vendors, precursors vendors, etc.), and the number is still widening (in some countries, hotels and accommodation resorts should keep a register of the people that stay in their facilities and share it with the Police). Shearing and Wood (2011) call it *enlistment* of private actors to work on behalf of the state. For instance, currently, if a woman or a child goes to the medical service with injuries of dubious origin, it should be reported to the Police or at least to the administrative services in charge of protecting women or children. Furthermore, nowadays in some countries people in charge of bars, restaurants, theatres, cinemas, concert halls and many other public facilities have to check whether the members of the public have got Covid-19 vaccination (or a negative test) in order to allegedly keep public health security. So, the incapacity of the state to take care of public security has been and is extremely manifested and, consequently, the state has been forced to *enlist* private actors in order to be able to properly guarantee public security. However, till very recently (in historical terms) the myth was still there and had not been really challenged. It was the large growth of private security companies maybe the most visible symptom of state's

power decadence (Crawford 2008). Especially, there are quite symbolic examples of the incapacity of the state to take over the responsibility on security. The fact that public facilities are protected by private security (even Police facilities) offers a clear message about the new trends. Even legislative reforms in some Western countries have allowed private security to take care of security in public spaces (even some Police tasks haven been carried out by private security in UK, and commercial areas are the domain of private security in most countries in our geopolitical context).

Furthermore, it should be stressed that dynamics of modern societies have weakened informal social controls. Two connected factors should be mentioned as core in the dismantlement of them, first of all, the growing mobility of our societies. Previously, people could always be in the same territory for their whole life, working just some hundred metres away from home and being their whole life in a very well-known environment. Nowadays, people can live in a city, work or study in a different one, have a cultural or sport activity in a third one, getting out in the evenings in a different space, and spend weekends in a second residence far away of their daily whereabouts. The amount of risk's spheres generated by that mobility is huge, impossible to protect without the self-responsibility of people. This weakening of social spatial links has implied that people around us have lost the capacity to influence our conduct. Who can tell the man in the newsagent's box that a kid did something wrong? (to reflect on the most popular Jacob's example—Jacobs 1961). He may not know the parents of the kid and even may not speak the same language as his family. Secondly, the fading of institutional social controls such as religion, family and school, in a world with individual rights as a centre of our values have, on one side, demotivated informal social controls and, on the other side, caused quite a confuse situation. People are not certain that parents will accept information about wrongdoing of their children, and teachers can be afraid of the reaction of parents of punished pupils. Contrary to the past, parents tend to protect mainly children's liberty rather than monitor their conducts. However, the State has provided with quite a contradictory response. In such a kingdom of individualism and proscription of authoritarianism, the State has tried to involve the Police in taking care of former informal social control mechanisms that have been gone (Guillén 2015; Loubet del Bayle 2012). The aforementioned importance of incivilities and external disorder in the people's perception of insecurity have moved politicians to substitute old controls by Police (and administrative controls). Fostered by the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling 1982) and its operational version some years after *broken windows policing* (also known as *zero tolerance policing*) by the New York Police under the guidance of its Police commissioner, Will Bratton, the idea of using the Police in order to get a civic behaviour of the public was spread everywhere. Its alleged positive effect in crime in New York stimulated its adoption in most of Western countries. There was no empirical evidence that the large crime reduction in New York had been caused by that policy, as several authors had pretended (Bottoms 2011; Guillén 2009; Karmen 2004; Shearing and Wood 2011; Taylor 1999), but NYPD and some well-known American criminologists with all their propaganda apparatus affirmed that zero tolerance with incivilities and hard criminal sentences were the key point not only to restore the perception of security but also to reduce criminality (Kübler

and de Maillard 2020). It is understandable that for the State (public powers), it is easier to produce norms and to activate the Police and criminal justice system rather than to bring the old social system back or substitute it by a new one. Since the issue of insecurity was in the political agenda (Crawford 2002; Guillén 2015), politicians felt that they were obliged to provide with a response to the problem. They probably did not realise that they were using the strongest power of the state (coercion) in order to substitute old informal social control systems (Guillén 2013). At the same time, Police powers were already quite strictly monitored, or, at least, people were sensitive to any use of the force (coaction) by Police. It was crystal clear that to use the Police to repress conducts such as throwing papers on the street, speaking loudly, begging, street drinking and any other incivility could be controversial in case they had to resort to the force (or to extremely high fines) to get a normative conduct from the public. People that could even agree on the need to cope with antisocial behaviour would probably see it as disproportionate. At the same time, it required an extensive use of the administrative machinery in order to get all the consequent penalties in force which could collapse local administration. Even, in some cases, Police reports could not be successful since legal provisions were in a lot of cases dubious due to their invasive effect in citizen's rights. The evidence for all that were public criticisms against those policies carried out in different cities and countries (Borja 2006; Guillén 2009; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004) Gradually, several thorough researches have criticised what they consider the old system to fight crime and have showed how even New York City has clearly distanced of such policies, qualifying them as simplistic and inefficient. As Glazer and Sharkey (2021, 4) affirm "After decades of relying on aggressive, zero-tolerance policing designed to dominate city streets, New York City was moving away from Police enforcement and criminal justice system operations as the exclusive response to violent crime...", "The new model is driven by the ideal of integration and relies on weaving together a social fabric composed of residents and community institutions, upheld by the social supports that government budgets are intended to nurture." As these authors show, there is no correlation between massive arrest and incarceration taxes and decrease of crime. In fact, between 2013 and 2019 arrests and incarceration reduced drastically and still crime kept going down. The current Major's Action Plan for Neighbourhood Safety tries to foster the strengths of neighbourhoods and residents by taking care of them, listening to them and improving the social bounds as much as possible.

However, it should be noted that in those countries where, parallel to Police interventions, wider policies involving other (municipal) services and fostering public commitment were deployed, the success to redress incivilities was much higher. For instance, alternatives for youngster's entertainment with the setting up of new facilities or new activities that could fill their free time have been efficient and have justified law enforcement for those that rejected to take part of the new reality (Guillén 2009). Some (Bottoms 2011) argue that fostering order in public spaces has also a multiplying effect. In the same sense that an unrepaired broken window can facilitate further destructive behaviours, the quick repairing of deteriorated spaces may stimulate civic behaviour. So a proactive public intervention can be much more useful

than just a repressive one. This kind of response is most of times out of the reach of Police and has to be taken under the command of other agencies.

There is another change that has questioned even much more seriously the traditional concept of state. The unprecedented international mobility and the development of new technologies, especially the birth of internet, have also overwhelmed state's power to combat traditional crime (Bowling and Shepticky 2012; Guillén 2015). Criminal gangs have now more than ever ramifications in different states and cannot be prosecuted without the co-operation of other states. The web is out of the state control (it is in a virtual territory with servers that may be thousands of kilometres away of the state where a crime is committed using the web). Cyberspace fits with difficulties to the traditional idea of state territory and also requires a very tough, thorough and efficient international co-operation (Brodeur 2010). So, the plurality of actors should also include foreign law enforcement agencies and even international ones (such as Interpol or Europol) (Brodeur 2010), without excluding transnational private security companies (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). This co-operation is difficult to monitor and is enveloped in a sort of dark cloud, since it is not usual the case that there is transparency concerning the laws that have been enforced in every case and the responsibilities of each one (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012).

1.4 The Heterogeneity of Crime and Insecurity. Places, Times and Different Vulnerabilities

Crime and insecurity can be caused but extremely diverse factors. First of all, as it has already been mentioned, they are not equivalent concepts or synonymous. Outbreaks of insecurity can be the result of factors other than crime. A disordered neighbourhood, the presence of newcomers, antisocial behaviour, repeated news about crime in media, It is likely that in most cases, crime and insecurity happen at the same time in the same spaces although not with a proportional correlation. That is to say, in spaces where crimes take place, people can have a negative perception of security. However, it is not necessary that the crime be very serious (homicides) in order to cause a high perception of insecurity. We can, then, have a third situation in which crime and insecurity coincide but with no proportionate correlation. For example, high levels of thefts can cause insecurity and serious fiscal crimes (not paying taxes) cannot.

It has already been noted that perception of insecurity can have its origins in very different factors. Consequently, in order to be able to tackle it, it will be crucial to identify particularly what's behind any insecurity outbreak to identify what should be done. Noisy streets, with people drinking and signing outside, require a different response that lack of public lighting and graffiti on the walls or increase of batteries and assaults. So identifying that the problem is a matter of perception is not enough so as to provide with an adequate response. The particular factors that ground it should be identified. Not always an increase of Police presence is needed or positive.

When it could be a contribution, additional contributions of further authors should also be included. An improvement in street lightening can be a solution sometimes, while in others may be irrelevant.

Crime cannot either be considered as a general or homogeneous problem. Actions oriented to prevent and repress crime vary enormously depending on the type of crimes, even within the same crime categories. To prevent homicides between gang members has nothing to do with the prevention of homicides in the area of gender violence. Burglaries have nothing to do with pickpocketing. Fraud of any sort of energy is meaningfully different from taxes fraud. We could mention thousands of differences. The parts of the territory, the seasons of the year and the times of the day would sometimes imply different measures and actors to be involved. So, this transversal character of the responses to crime and insecurity and the consequent intervention of multiple actors do not design a system of stable partners. Both, the measures to be taken and the partners, are bound to change in most of cases. Let us take perception of insecurity as an example. A crisis originated by the high presence of foreign juveniles wandering on public spaces would probably imply the intervention of education, immigration, juvenile services and, depending on the case, even the Police. Instead, another crisis caused by dirty and poorly lighted places requires a different approach (municipal brigades repairing lights, cleaning the spaces, campaigns to make the neighbours aware of the importance of keeping public spaces clean and some particular reports from the Police for incivilities).

So, crime and perception of insecurity are not equivalent concepts, but they are usually mixed, confused and overlapped into each other and both are part of the problem. Subjective security, or perception of security, is also a matter to be dealt with by security managers. People that feel unsafe modify their conducts and tend to aisle themselves or buying defence weapons, what means a severe risk for social life. It is crucial that those managers be able to detect what's behind that insecurity, no matter what it is. The times when the only relevant factor to be tackled in the area of security was crime or objective risk are gone. However, there is no absolutely contrasted methodology to articulate the proper responses. There have been notable instruments that have been produced by different institutions (e.g. "Guide sur les audits locaux de sécurité. Synthèse de la pratique internationale"³ "The Efus Safety Audit Guide: A guide to better understand new challenges in urban security"). However, they provide with extremely thorough procedures of analysis that, although can be excellent for planning, are normally out of reach for operational actors, be they Police officers or not. Actors on the field are expected not to delay responses to expressions of fear and insecurity coming from the population, especially if there has been political controversy among the public. Aware of this difficulty, in the framework of the Cutting Crime Impact Project,⁴ the Department of Interior of the Generalitat of Catalonia designed the toolkit "Perception Matters".⁵ It is a sort of guide to provide actors

³ Vid. https://issuu.com/efus/docs/efus_safety_audit_f_web_61c0ac6ea0dd07.

⁴ Vid. <https://cuttingcrimeimpact.eu>.

⁵ Vid. https://interior.gencat.cat/web/.content/home/010_el_departament/publicacions/seguretat/Toolkit/booklet_Digital_ENG_no_20210602.pdf.

in the field (prevention officers, city officials, Police officers) with practical advice in order to be able to detect the grounds that cause any insecurity outbreak and provide with appropriate responses looking for the adequate actor for any action. During the experimental use of the toolkit, it was detected, for instance, that the insecurity of an area of the old city district of Barcelona had mainly to do with what neighbours considered an institutional abandonment of the area. No matter that the strict security indicators have improved considerably in last years, they kept thinking that they were in an unsafe situation since they did not perceive institutional involvement in neighbourhood needs. So, in this case, one of the main responses to offer is a much better communication between all municipal levels and the population of the area, since actually, the municipality had carried out numerous and intense actions in the area to improve public spaces. However, it had not been exactly the case some years ago, when the levels of drugs dealing in private occupied apartments (their fundamental concern) were really much higher than nowadays, and Police and administrative measures to fight it were needed (and taken).

Another source of insecurity and victimisation is vulnerable groups. They are made out of people that for different reasons are in a position that make them a target for crime or place them in a quite weak position in which it is very hard to feel safe. Minority members, young people in marginalised areas, homeless or senior people can be clear examples. So, strategies should be designed in order to protect members of those groups. However, the fact that in all cases the goal is provide vulnerable groups with protection does not mean that we need similar measures and actors to realise our objectives. For instance, Police presence and protection will be received in a very different ways among youngsters, seniors or minorities. Public agencies involved in youngsters, minority members or seniors are different as the problematics as well. For instance, it is likely that immigration services may have some role to play with some groups of minorities and more unlikely with homeless or seniors.

It is evident that the number and kind of actors in every case are related to the background situation and it is not possible to draft a uniform list of them for all security policies. Anyhow, saying that security policies require a transversal approach is not saying that much in relation to the necessary partners for all of them. They should be identified in any case. The municipality of Barcelona drafted in 2019 a map of prevention's actions with more than 500 foreseen actions, defining quite precisely what should be done and who should take part in each one.⁶ That is an approach that takes into account what here has just been said, actions should answer to particular circumstances to be effective. A general prevention plan cannot be more than an umbrella for all particular actions.

To frame all those actions and actors, it will be necessary that somebody assumes the leadership to select and look for adequate partners. It is not possible to establish it in a general way, further than drafting legal provisions that call for such an integrated approach. Without leadership, it will hard to identify, mobilise and manage all necessary actors to cope with particular security dysfunctions. So, one of

⁶ Vid. <https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/prevencio/ca/directori-accions-prevencio>.

the crucial points is to agree on who should take the role of leader, but that will be discussed further on.

1.5 The Organisation of Multiple Actors

The need to involve several partners in the maintenance of security brings up a not minor problem: how to manage it. Different actors mean different authorities, diverse organisational cultures and combination of frequently segmented visions of the problem. It is not enough to involve different actors; they should also undertake complementary actions, not duplicated or contradictory ones. All actions should be oriented in the same direction, and there should be somebody with the capacity to decide in cases of conflict. At least there should be mechanisms to sort out different perspectives of actors that have the capacity to impulse and lead the strategies. We have already experienced it within the Police world itself, where different Police organisations working at different territorial levels (or with different specialisations) have been forced to make their efforts complementary as much as possible, in order to represent a coherent Police system not always successfully (Guillén and Calaresu 2021). Brodeur (2010) uses the term “policing web” to properly describe the concurrence of diverse actors (he includes even private ones) in the policing function. So, the variety of actors is not new even for those used to work in the field of policing.

In order to precise everybody’s role and responsibilities, some formalisation of the process has been required (in Spain, mainly the autonomous communities have enacted several laws that aim to precise what should do every Police service and security actors in order to get a coherent system and how they should co-operate—Guillén 2014; Guillén and Calaresu 2021). The forms it has taken may vary, being the most common ones (apart from legislation): a sort of contract among all partners in a replication of private contracts and security plans that include specific objectives, duties, responsibilities and evaluation criteria. In any case, there must be a certain formalisation of what everybody should do in order to make all interventions have a multiplying effect and to avoid duplications or contradictions (Guillén 2006; Hewitt et al. 2000). However, it should not imply a bureaucratisation of public response to security troubles. If it has been hardly criticised that Police are quite bureaucratic (and rigid) in their interventions and that is an obstacle to tackle changing background problems, we cannot pretend that bureaucratising all partners can bring anything positive (Guillén 2006).

This conception of the collective or plural response to security troubles, similar to the ones in other fields, has had as collateral consequence the incorporation of the concept “governance”, as a capacity to push those initiatives ahead with the necessary stimulus and coordination, as a way of governing all the actors intervening in managing the cities (Pasqual 2011). A stream that assists to flow in a fluid way the whole project, “a new way of governing contemporary societies, especially cities and metropolitan areas, which is characterised by managing the interdependencies between all of the agents involved in tackling the urban challenge and in seeking

the greatest degree of collaboration and public responsibility in treating it” (Pasqual 2011, 11).

The questions to be solved are as follows: which are the criteria to deliver responsibilities, how the connection between different interventions should be kept in a way that the results are not negatively affected and who is going to lead the whole process. How should be organised the governance of these processes? The enthusiasts of modern community Police approach advocate for a Police lead of the whole process. The debate is: provided that nowadays community policing means co-production of security, should Police assume the governance of all the process (Fernández and Yñíguez 2014)? This idea, although quite flexible in relation to the traditional approaches to security and policing, since it accepts that further actors should be included, still is rooted in the idea that security is a Police responsibility. Consequently, they should lead, foster and monitor the whole process of producing security and preventing crime. There is no doubt that Police have a privileged position since they are the only public service that works 24 h a day/365 days per year on the beat. That provides them with a lot of knowledge about social dynamics and key actors in the different territories. However, as mentioned before, Police have their own particular perspective and the rest of actors have different ones and different dependencies which makes it difficult to place them under the monitoring/coordination of the Police. Even their goals are different from the ones other actors have. It is not the Police to decide which goal/approach is going to be predominant in the intervention of every actor. Furthermore, if we understand that insecurity expressions are related to educational, health, unemployment, social services, inclusive urbanism and so on, to involve the natural actors in these fields in security policies and put these policies under the hands of Police means securitising them. That is to say, we would not be providing with better education or health care for everybody because it is fair or fundamental rights, but in order to prevent security incidents (Guillén 2015; Loader and Walker 2007). Everything would be taken into account depending on its incidence in security, which is perverse. So, investment in deprived neighbourhoods it would not be any longer a matter of justice but of crime prevention and, consequently, the target population would be transformed in potential criminals. In the same direction, facilitate *positive* forms of entertainment for young people would not be a matter of improve their culture and quality of life, but a sort of insurance against the temptation of crime (Crawford 2002).

It could be established the principle of competence: the actor to be given priority and command is that one that is in better position to achieve the goal pursued by every action. For instance, if there is an action focusing on making drug addicts to overcome their addiction, it is not something that Police know how to do. There are other professionals (medical, social) that have the knowledge, the skills and resources to be successful in that field. Theoretically, that is simple and apparently feasible. However, reality is more complex. There are goals of the different actors that can be contradictory. To continue with the same example, it is possible that somebody under a detox treatment of drugs can commit some offence related to consumption or trafficking. Very probably, Police would reclaim their functions as law enforcement agency and be tempted to intervene. However, a very strict law enforcement could

jeopardise the process of detox of that person because it could mean removing him/her from a “protected” space and jeopardising the whole detox programme. It is also true that, in some landscapes, law enforcement could be a reinforcement of the detox way, but it depends on the circumstances and the decision cannot be left in Police hands. There should be somebody (or some mechanism) capable to take those controversial decisions. Let us take a different example: let us imagine that there is a plan to tackle the security and crime problems in a particular degraded area. It may include a quick cleaning of any graphite or draw on the walls. However, the municipal unit in charge of cleaning public spaces may have some other priorities because its responsibilities go beyond the security strategies. In these times of pandemic cleanliness in public places, parks, benches, etc., may be a priority. Should Police decide which is the action to be given priority? It is sensible to think that there should be somebody with a wider perspective and capacity to decide in all concerned fields.

It should also be taken into account that there are professionals with overlapping areas of intervention that mistrust each other and a joined action cannot be commanded by any of them. Social services tend to consider homeless a very vulnerable group and tend to support them, whereas some other public services (not only the Police) can think that they are responsible for their situation and that that support is an obstacle to reintegrate them in normal social life, since that would mean that they get away with their previous asocial behaviour. Immigration services and Police also tend to disagree in policies for migrants; social services and educational services do not always agree in what is better for members of the vulnerable groups. In consequence, there should be further goals that allow for a particular priority of different actions. No matter that the achievement of those goals depends on the all partner's actions, it cannot be done just with the isolated enforcement of all them. Every action should be carried out in coordination with others that have influence in the same area. The governor, manager or leader of all that there should be someone with capacity and enough leadership to be followed by all actors. Actually, there is also a matter of legitimacy that will be dealt with in the next chapter in order to establish levels of decision and leadership.

Eventually, there is the public, the people that have to be involved in these processes of security co-production. In which terms are they integrated? It is clear that a society with such a high level of risk areas it is not manageable without the involvement and the responsibility of the public (Guillén 2016), but who should guide and monitor what they do? Could they be left to their good will? Are their perspectives compatible with the ones of other actors? Even are the perspectives of different sectors of the public compatible? It is quite a delicate issue to define which the paper of the public should be in this approach to security. It does not matter if we take the people as individual or we talk about private associations that can provide with crucial contributions to security. Some years ago, in 2009, the municipality of Barcelona drafted what they called “prevention and conviviality's actor map of Barcelona”. There they identified all actors involved in any way in relevant functions in order to facilitate crime prevention in the city. Well, it turned out that more than 50% of them were private. Normally, different kinds of NGOs work in areas that promote prevention (support to drug addicts, to ex-mates, homeless people, etc.). It

is evident that those groups should be taken into account in Barcelona prevention policies. Something more complex that we are going to discuss in the following chapter is where they take their legitimation from and which should be their role in relation of the rest of actors or partners.

This multi-actor reality has a lot of implications. First of all, the kind of contribution of each actor should be coherent with the legal powers they have, the legitimation of every actor does not come from the same source, and it should affect their role. Furthermore, most of them are not looking for the general interest, but for theirs, and a way to adapt that to public policies and interest should be devised. So, there should be coordination mechanisms to give some coherence to all that. Anyway, mission, legitimation, relations to the law, relations with public powers and citizens and accountability should be revisited and reconstructed. Most probably, those items will have a different meaning depending on the actors and the field of action should be defined. Security requires complex and diverse systems, and it is not something temporary, but it is here to stay.

1.6 New Model of Security. Partners, Legitimacies and Responsibilities

There is no doubt that this global or multiple actor's approach to security is not only valid for specific areas or problems, but also for the general model of security/policing. It is evident that we are within a system of plural security (Guillén 2016), that in the Anglo-Saxon context is called *plural policing* (as mentioned before) (Newburn 2008). All security issues have to be handled considering the actions of all actors, be they public or private ones. We have just said that the correct implementation of the system requires particular adequate actions and actors; however, we are now to deepen on the qualitative role of different categories of actors that build the whole security system.

Once this point of reasoning has been reached, we should think on the political bases of the model/system. Where does legitimacy come from in the new security world? Does it come from a single source? Have the diverse actors the same political position? Can all of them intervene in any area of security? In which way?

It is quite obvious that not all actors have the same *quality* for the model. All are necessary partners but their position varies profoundly. We can start with the Police. Which is the Police *qualitative* role? Where do they get the legitimacy from? If we take into account the theoretically democratic framework of Western states, Police legitimacy cannot come from anywhere else but the public, the people (Guillén 2016). One of democracy basic principles is that sovereignty is based on the people. We are dealing here with what we could call *material legitimacy*, since Police get the formal legitimacy from intervening within the legal framework. That is to say, law provides the Police with formal legitimacy and the people with the material one. If we accept that in Democracy material legitimacy is central, that has several implications:

- People should intervene in the establishment of Police priorities.
- Police should be articulated as a public service rather than as a force.
- Police should be accountable before the public.

In this framework, Police mission would be the satisfaction of the needs of the public providing them with an efficient security service that allow them to carry out their daily activities facing reasonable risks they can manage (Guillén 2021). It is important to clarify that absolute security is a goal to be discarded, because it is impossible and trying to achieve it may be a catastrophe (in the same line that health authorities cannot promise us eternal life). That service provided by the Police should be transparent, offering the public all necessary information to make a proper assessment of the security situation and Police performance. Only Police data concerning running investigations should be kept away of public. The traditional resort to “security issues” in order to keep most Police data away from the eyes of the public should not be used in the next future. Nevertheless, Harkin (2015) considers that there are natural limits to Police transparency that should be taken into account.

Obviously, this satisfaction of the needs of the public has a limit: public demands to unfairly restrict rights of members of particular groups or any other citizen should be managed in a way that be acceptable for human right’s regulations. Actually, in order to be able to maintain security with the least resort to force, Police should get *auctoritas* from acting with procedural justice (Tyler 1996). Procedural justice would be integrated by four elements: participation, neutrality, dignity and trustworthy motives in Police interventions (Bates et al. 2015; Mastrofsky et al. 2016). Worden and Maclean (2018, 150) tell us what they consist of:

- People are more satisfied when they have an opportunity to ‘tell their side of the story—to explain their situation or behaviour to authorities.
- People are more satisfied when they believe that authorities’s decisions are based on facts.
- People are more satisfied when they feel that they have been treated with dignity and respect.
- People are more satisfied when they trust authorities’s motives, which is more likely when authorities explain their actions in terms that demonstrate that they have taken into account citizen’s concerns and needs.

It is not the fact that Police may intervene on people, restricting (sometimes very seriously) their rights what make the concerned ones to reject the Police. Most offenders know that what they do is inappropriate. It is the fact of feeling unfairness in the treatment by the Police towards them what influences their point of view about the Police (Tyler 2003, 2011). There is research that confirms that arrested people do not assess necessarily Police intervention as negative, which would be the case if the opinion depended on the severity of Police intervention (Guillén 2018). So Police fairness is important in all cases, even (especially) with criminals. In most cases, if they understand that Police did what she should, a Police severe intervention on them will not affect negatively Police legitimacy (Van Craen 2016). However, a disproportionate or disrespectful intervention before incivilities can endanger Police

reputation and legitimation. That is important because when people think that the system is reasonably fair (fair laws, good procedural justice in their execution), they tend to abide by the law (Tyler 1996), which should be the main way of law enforcement in democratic states. It would not be acceptable that the only way to get normative behaviour was the actual threat of coercion (or punishment). That would imply a mistrust between State and citizens on which no democracy cannot be built. Most authors assume that the effect of procedural justice on people is quite stable and invariant. However, very recent research points out that Police legitimation by procedural justice varies depending on the individuals (Pina and Brunton-Smith 2021). Still, it could be withheld that in general terms procedural justice (Police fairness) would be a positive factor in order to keep Police legitimacy on the eyes of the public. Even, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2017) affirm, Police legitimacy affects the authority of the State. A lack of it means a serious trouble for the credibility of the State and, consequently, for the acceptance of its rules.

Legitimation for any other public services involved in security plans, contracts, projects or networks would not be far away from this of the Police. Since all public prerogatives come from the people, those would get legitimation from public consent and satisfaction. Although only Police can use directly physical force, many other public agencies are allowed to exert the state power of sanctioning by different ways. Parents that do not take care of their children can lose social benefits, those that do not pay taxes within deadline are charged with additional amounts of money (fines), etc. So, even a certain procedural justice could be applicable to some other public agencies involved in transversal security plans, no great differences with the Police source of legitimation.

Legitimation of private companies, especially private security ones, is in its origin radically different from the public ones. They have, of course, the same formal legitimation, acting according to the law. In case their employees violate the law, there is no legal support for them and can be sanctioned. They have also a second level of formal legitimacy: the bilateral contracts between providers and buyers of security services. Private security companies sign contracts with their clients where they oblige themselves to provide certain services (protecting client rights, properties and activities) in exchange for an amount of money. That is to say, if private companies provide with the promised services according to the law, no objection can be made to them. No matter how awful the client may be or how unfair can be their activities. The company fulfils its duty keeping the client safe, although security levels can be very low in the roundabouts. Satisfaction can also be important here, but only concerning the company's services. Shearing and Wood (2011) raised the concept of *market accountability*. Under this idea, private security companies would be *monitored* by the market, since they would get more or less contracts depending on their efficiency or prestige. However, again this monitoring does not guarantee that public interest is taken into account, but an assumption that the companies are efficient in the fulfilment of their contractual obligations. In order to prevent that private companies take exclusively into account their customer's interests, states have introduced some legal provisions to constraint them to co-operate with Police services and public security strategies, even, as it is the case in Spain, providing them

with the quality of authority's agents when they work under the commandment of Police.⁷ In more general terms, it is clear that the State, after the growing evidence of its incapacity, has been involving private security companies to guarantee public security (Shearing and Wood 2011; Dupont 2014). It is an attempt to get positive outputs for the general security system from activities that are originally thought for private benefit. However, conceptually, this is not that different from the legal obligations for doctors, teachers, hotel managers, etc. They are thought to provide a service for a price, to make a living of it, and legislation requires them to carry out some surveillance activities for the system. So, in some way what they do is not one 100% private and they are under some kind of monitoring by public authorities.

A very sensitive question is the legitimation of the public. If we understand that such a complex and mobile society cannot be protected if there is no co-operation from the citizenry (Guillén 2016, 2018), a source of legitimacy for it should be identified. The simplest answer could be: provided that democracy is based on the people, they possess the sovereignty and their actions are legitimate *per se*, in origin. However, that definition of sovereignty is said to belong to the people as a group, as a concept, not individually to all of them. Otherwise, were we to provide with individual legitimacy to every citizen, what would happen when they propose opposed priorities or actions? Moreover, it is not guaranteed that citizen's priorities or actions proposed for them are looking for the general interest. Even when they claim that what they are demanding responds to the general interest, it is not necessarily the case. For instance, it is quite usual that neighbours in a particular area of the city ask for more Police presence on the streets near their homes. It does not mean that there is no need for it in other urban spaces or that there are enough constables to guarantee their demand without overlooking other ones (Guillén 2016). That is to say, citizen's needs and demands respond to their reality, their particular fears or problematics and it is not usual that they take into consideration other territories' or people's needs, although there are experiences of sensibility towards problems in other neighbourhoods different from theirs (Harkin 2015). So, quite often they represent particular interests, not the general one. Sometimes, even neighbours can ask public actors (especially the Police) to carry out illegal actions or interventions in prejudice of third people. For this reason, it should be stressed that citizens are entitled to address the Police (and any other public actor) their priorities and proposal of actions, but it does not mean that they should be put into practice in all cases. As clearly points out Harkin (2015), it is the Police the actor with higher responsibilities in keeping democracy and the general interest. Maybe it could be widened to say: public agencies are the only ones obliged to maintain or promote the general interest. That would imply the assumption that security governance should come from the state, since it should pursue the general interest. However, this assumption is controversial, as we are going to see now.

There is no academic consensus about whether the legitimation of security governance should come from the state. That is to say, some argue, that, although several public and private actors should be involved in networking in order to produce safe

⁷ Vid art. 31 of the Law 5/2014, of 4th of April, of private security.

environments, they could only get legitimation from the state, because its authorities are the only ones that have gone through a political process of legitimation. So, the state should give a sort of “go-ahead” and monitor it. A clear exponent of that was the former Local Security contracts in France (and to a lesser extent in Italy) at the beginning of the century and the current prevention plans at different territorial levels in France and other countries (CEN-TR 14,383–2 2007; Germain 2012; Guillén 2011). Those, although include different actors, are always under the supervision of a member of the government (in case of the “local contracts of security” introduced by Jospin’s Government the last legislature of the twentieth century) or the municipality (in case of the “local contracts of security and crime prevention”, introduced by law in 2007 in France). Holley and Shearing (2017) think that those multi-actor projects could work properly without any *central* (state, administration) control. To their eyes, it is the same group of actors that guarantees the good orientation and efficiency of it. They can work properly with or without state intervention. However, Shearing and Wood (2011) accept that not all *their nodes* are in the same position in terms of power, and there are weaker and stronger ones. They propose to design strategies in order to empower the weaker *nodes* and make them able to *compete* with the stronger ones. For instance, the fact that a weak *node* (an NGO, for instance) can be seen as a right’s defender can make their position stronger before the Police and the public (provided that the majority of public considers human rights as core of the system).

What we could qualify as the normative position (as a quite solid exponent of it, Loader and Walker 2007, that qualify their proposal as *anchored pluralism*) opposes to accept governance without the state supervision, because it would lack of legitimation and a general interest perspective. Loader and Walker (2007) argue that, since security is ontologically social (it is directly related to our life in society) and is the instrument (or the constitutive element) for other social goods, it should be managed by somebody with legitimacy for ruling the whole system thinking of the general interest. Those authors accept that there are risks in keeping a ruling role for the state. They mention four main ones: *paternalism*, *consumerism*, *authoritarianism* and *fragmentation*. So, the state should not pretend that its agents are the only ones with capability to cope with security challenges, since they have proved their inefficiency; at the same time, it should not try to provide services only because they are asked by people, should not only focus on Police and criminal justice and should prevent inequalities by fragmentation of the security offer depending on the level of income. If those caveats are under control, the State is supposed to be best actor with legitimacy to lead the whole process of security governance.

However, Holley and Shearing (2017) sustain that the presence of the State does not guarantee a good governance of security; the key factor is to be able to get the proper actions of all actors with power or influence in a particular situation. In some moments, even it seems dubious that they consider “governance” as necessary, since it may be understood as a centralisation of the process that they reject. That is to say, there is a pragmatic approach (*what works is okay*) rather than a principle’s one. Scarpello (2016, 114) describes very well both positions: “...the starting point of both nodal governance and anchored pluralism is the effects of neoliberal globalization on

the provision of policing services. The first then argues that the proliferation of nodes indicates that the pluralization has gone beyond neoliberal-driven privatization and globalization-induced trans-nationalism (Scarpello 2016, 114), and that nodes are neither state nor non-state, but new forms of governance outside the state parameters (Scarpello 2016, 114). Anchored pluralism instead argues for the need to keep the state in the core of pluralized policing via its power to supervise and legislate over non-state policing actors". There is, still, another position, the so-called *multi-choice policing* (Baker 2008; Scarpello 2016). It is applied to realities, such Africa, where the presence of the state has always been very weak (with the exception of Northern Africa and South Africa). The monopoly of the power of coercion by the state has not been a reality there, and when it has been tried, it was brutal and focused on domination of lower classes rather than providing with general security. Consequently, it did not get acceptance from the communities that preferred alternative forms of protection (Baker 2008). Then, the different realities, the availability of capable actors and the acceptance of communities built security systems where further than the State or private companies, local communities were also called to perform security functions. So, the duality public/private is widened with the population. Baker (2008) argues that since most state experiences in Africa only pursued the imposition of the dominion of the elites, we can conclude that state Police services had not a different nature from private security. Both were thought to preserve particular interests. So, the separation public-private is extremely blurred. The last perspective (multi-choice policing) would not be far away from the *nodal* approach since the role of the state is not really meaningful in any of them.

It is not easy to solve this dispute (in case it is possible or necessary). Theoretically, it is true that the different actors have different (and sectorial) interests. Even it can be argued that security can be left in the hands of concurrent particular interests and benefits. There should be a need or interest for everybody that, although they can be different from one to another, would guarantee the global general interest of the community. Actually, it was like that before the State. However, political science has advocated that it is the State the one born to guarantee social peace, what would include to provide with a sort of social harmony that allowed the political society to survive. However, in practice, the state, as acknowledged by Loader and Walker (2007), and even by Baker (2008) (although he focuses on Africa), has been dominated for particular groups, adopting partisan positions that have taken care of interests of different groups instead of those general. Actually, democratic elections consist of different groups with different interests and priorities that compete for the vote of electors. The ones that get the power (the majority) to rule try to impose their point of view about the public goods, in a way that it will be said that favours the general interest, although they are only interested in theirs. As Shearing and Wood (2011, 150) state: "...elected governments are, by definition, partisan. They represent the interests of a party or a coalition of parties that...represent the interests of scarcely a fraction of the country's citizens".⁸ So, that neutral entity that necessarily

⁸ The book consulted by the author was a Spanish version. The translation into English was made by the same author and may not coincide with the original version in English.

pursues the general interest would be more a will, an illusion, than a reality. However, it is true that there is a formal process in order to theoretically build political legitimation and accountability of state representatives and there is not such a process in the case of private companies (including security ones), citizens or NGOs. Still, there is some room to influence the leadership of governance (in all areas) if it is placed in the hands of state, mainly taking into account the current process of politicisation of security (Kübler and de Maillard 2020). If security policies are discussed in the political (electoral) debate, the winning option would have certain democratic legitimacy. Otherwise, it will be practically impossible. On the other hand, when Shearing and Wood (2011) are faced with the inequality of nodes that could result in a security system where only the strongest would have a say, they refuse that risk, arguing that such weak nodes should be empowered in order to participate with a similar level of influence and power as the other ones. However, who should empower the weaker nodes? In order to get them empowered, somebody should take the active role in it. Who could have interest in it? The strongest ones? It does not seem likely that the ones with more possibilities to impose their interests are going to promote something that worsens their position. So, again there should be somebody that, taking into consideration issues of justice and equality (public goods), could establish mechanisms or put in place actions that would increase the power of influence of weaker nodes. Who can/should do that except the state? Eventually, *anchored pluralism* and the nodal perspective are not that far away: all of them, at some point, think that some corrections to the *natural* balance of strengths should be done. The normative position proposes the state as that called to perform such a role (which would require some adjustments in case of international networks and *nodes*) and the nodal one does not clarify who should do it. If we look to the *multi-choice policing*, it is not clear either how the choice should be done in order to obtain a proper and balanced participation in the *choice* of all groups or nodes.

Eventually, such complex networks or partnerships make the public very difficult to identify who is responsible for what. It would be a good temptation to focus responsibility on those that have been legitimated by an electoral process, that is to say, the state. Although there are many actors, since we have just said that the State should perform a sort of supervisory role, we could forget who actually failed in their commitments and understand that the supervisor is the final actor to be blamed for the failure, because the failure would evidence that supervision did not work. This thread of argumentation makes certain sense, since it is true that the supervisor or the leader (call it as you prefer) failed in keeping all the actors fulfilling their commitments. However, it would be unfair and inefficient to exonerate private and civilian partners of responsibilities. No matter that supervisory powers should be accountable, actual actors should also face responsibility. At least, to be known as inefficient actors, which in case of private companies would not be a minor question. So, all actors should be accountable for what they had assumed to do, with different kind of responsibilities, political in some cases, commercial in other ones and at the level of prestige for those that do not have any kind of monetary profit in their actions.

The identification of responsibilities, however, is not likely to be possible if there is no transparency in the procedure of establishing needs and priorities, designing

actions and actors. If normally, only with public actors, there is a thick cloud to prevent the concrete actors (persons) bearing the last responsibility for administration failures from being accountable, when we face different *nodes*, qualitatively diverse, taking part in complementary or coordinated actions, the chance to identify who is responsible for the results, good or bad ones, becomes a very hard work. So, an increase of transparency and communication will be a requirement without which responsibilities (positive or negative) will not exist, and the credibility and legitimacy of these networks will vanish in the air. It is important to remember that procedural justice, as it has been said, includes proper and enough information about what's on, why and who does what. Without that information, people cannot assess whether the system is looking for the common good or favouring private ones. So, transparency will be a prerequisite for the acceptance of it by the public. It is convenient in this point to remember that, as it has also been said above, this transparency will be even much harder to achieve when there be international or transnational actors (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012).

1.7 Some Conclusions as Starting Point of the New Governance of This Plural System of Security

It is clear that Police or the state is unable to keep even the appearance of guaranteeing security by themselves. First of all, the state needs the co-operation of other states and international organisms, whose decision-making process is out of reach of the State (or at least, requires a certain consensus with foreign and international actors). Secondly, there is no doubt that security policies should be designed and executed taking into account something else than criminality and Police. There is far sufficient evidence for that. So, the traditional narrow-minded approaches should be forgotten. It is paramount that not only diverse disciplines are called to produce security but also a plurality of actors is necessary to intervene in crucial areas that may affect security. Other public agencies different from Police and the criminal justice agencies should be incorporated. In the private sector, it is not only private security companies, but neighbour associations, NGOs and even individual citizens should take part, in different manners, in maintaining security. Otherwise, keeping a reasonable level of security for all would be a chimera.

The state (public administrations) that so far has failed to approach security in a proper democratic way should impulse and monitor the plural response to detected weaknesses. The different type of actors (nodes) are not in the position to do that by themselves (or would do it in their interest). The state should guarantee that fundamental rights are respected (rule of law) and that all necessary actors are involved in a way that can make their points of view heard and their action capabilities properly incorporated. The State should impulse and monitor security networks, but be ready to leave protagonism and a high degree of initiative and decision when other partners

are working in their particular dominions. The State should not be the Police of the network, but the promotor, driving force and facilitator.

The security system should be aware of the need to establish particular actions and partnerships in order to cope with different security problematics. General plans or policies should establish the principles that should rule the procedure of analysing and articulating responses to public demands or needs. They should also create the mechanisms that facilitate the identification of necessary actors and the way to make them active. The State should not use this plural process as a way to legitimate previously taken decisions. It should keep the process of analysis, decision and implementation within the necessary fairness. All groups and interests should be taken into account as much as possible in order to prevent and tackle security troubles.

Police have still a role in the system, although far away of an exclusive one. They should integrate themselves in wider policies and strategies, working in coordination with other public and private actors in order to achieve the common security goals. Nevertheless, Police should keep being the only actor with power to use physical force and should have the whole citizenry as target of their interventions. So, Police should, within the legal framework (actually all actors should do), perform their role within the general strategies and policies keeping in mind that they are a public service for all.

Transparency of all procedures, roles, actions and systems of accountability for all is a requirement *sine qua non*. It is not only public actors that should be transparent and responsible for their actions. Individuals, private companies and associations, as far as they take part in maintaining security, a public good, should be submitted to the same rules of transparency and accountability as public actors.

References

- Baker B (2008) In: Multi-choice policing in Africa. Uppsala, Nordiska afrikainstitutet
- Bates LJ, Antrobus E, Bennet S, Martin P (2015) Comparing police and public perceptions of a routine traffic encounter. In *Police Quarter* 18(4):442–468
- Borja J (2006) Pors urbanes i demandes de seguretat: la repressió preventiva. In: *Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública*. vol 16. pp 77–84
- Bottoms A (2011) Actes incívics: incompliment de les normes socials i les seves conseqüències per a les localitats. In *Apunts De Seguretat* 10:41–54
- Bottoms A, Tankebe J (2017) Police legitimacy and the authority of the state. In: Bois-Pedain D et al (eds) *Criminal law and the authority of the state (Studies in Penal Theory and Penal Ethics)*. Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp 47–88
- Bowling B, Sheptycki J (2012) *Global policing*. Sage, London
- Brodeur JP (2010) *The policing web*. Oxford University Press
- CEN TR 14383–2 (2007) *Prevention of crime—urban planning and building design—part 2: urban planning*
- Crawford A (2002) Las políticas de seguridad local y de prevención de la delincuencia en Inglaterra y en el País de Gales: nuevas estrategias y nuevos proyectos. In *Revista Catalana De Seguretat Pública* 11:83–124
- Crawford A (2008) Plural policing in the UK: policing beyond la police. In: Newburn T (ed) *Handbook of policing*. Segunda Edición. Cullompton, Portland, Willan Publishing, pp 147–181

- Dupont B (2014) Private security regimes: conceptualizing the forces that shape the private delivery of security. *Theoretical Criminol.* <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480614527303>
- González CJ, Yñíguez A (2014) *Gestió Estratègica de la policia. Organització de l'eficiència en el treball policial.* Sevilla, Punto Rojo Libros
- Germain S (2012) Le retour des villes dans la gestion de la sécurité en France et en Italie. In: *Déviance et Société.* vol 36(1). pp 61–84
- Glazer E, Sharkey P (2021) Social fabric: a new model of public safety and vital neighbourhoods. The square one project. (https://squareonejustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Social-Fabric-A-New-Model-for-Public-Safety-and-Vital-Neighborhoods_Liz-Glazer-and-Pat-Sharkey_WEB_FINAL.pdf)
- Guillén F (2006) Les polítiques locals de prevenció i seguretat a Europa. In: *la Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública.* vol 16. pp 55–74
- Guillén F (2009) Dalle 'finestre rotte' alla lotta contro la delinquenza: alcuni passaggi perduti. In: Carrer F (dir) *Le politiche della sicurezza. Dalla "polizia comunitaria" alla "tolleranza zero"*. Roma, Franco Angelli, pp 76–100
- Guillén F (2011) Policies on public security. In *Papers Rev Num* 53:6–11
- Guillén F (2013) La Policia i la seguretat en els espais públics. In: *Working Papers Núm.* vol 315. Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials
- Guillén F (2014) Tendances actuelles dans les services de Police. In: Mathieu M, y Froment JC (dir) *La réforme de l'État et Globalisation—La circulation des modèles en question.* Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, pp 229–242
- Guillén F (2015) *Modelos de policía y Seguridad.* Doctoral Thesis. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
- Guillén F (2016) In: Bosch (ed) *Modelos de policía. Hacia un modelo de Seguridad plural.* Barcelona
- Guillén F (2018) In: Bosch (ed) *Desencuentros entre la policía y el público. Factores de riesgo y estrategias de gestión.* Barcelona
- Guillén F (2021) The fallacy of objective security and its consequences. *Int E-J Criminal Sci* 16
- Guillén F, Calaresu M (2021) L'evoluzione dei sistemi di polizia nel contesto europeo occidentale. In cerca di un equilibrio tra globale e locale. In: Giannone D, Cozzolino A (eds) *Fratture nell'Unione. L'Europa dentro le crisi del XXI secolo.* Sesto San Giovanni, Ed. Mimesis
- Harkin D (2015) «Simmel, the police form and the limits of democratic policing». In *British J Criminol* 55:730–746
- Hewitt J, Cryle G, Ballintyne (2000) *Threads of success. A study of community safety partnership in Scotland.* Scottish Executive
- Hobbes T (1651/1980) *Leviatán o la materia, forma y poder de una república eclesiástica y civil.* México, Fondo de Cultura Económica
- Holley C, Shearing C (2017) A nodal perspective of governance: advances in nodal governance thinking. In: Drahos P (ed) *Regulatory theory: foundations and applications.* Canberra, Australian National University Press
- Karmen A (2004) Zero tolerance in New York City: hard questions for a get-tough policy. In: Hopkins Burke R (ed) *Hard Cop, Soft Cop. Dilemmas and debates in contemporary policing.* Cullompton, Portland, Willan Publishing, pp 23–39
- Killias M (2010) Crime surveys as tools of policy-making. In: 10 years of the crime victimisation survey in Catalonia. European experiences. Assessment and Future Challenges. Barcelona, Department of Interior, pp 9–18
- Kübler D, de Maillard J (2020) « Why European mayors emphasize urban security: evidence from a survey in 28 European countries. In *Europ J Criminol.* Published on 15th May
- Jacobs J (1961) In: *The death and life of great American cities.* New York, Random House
- Loader I, Walker N (2007) In: *Civilizing security.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kindle version. Retrieved from Amazon.com
- Loubet del Bayle JL (2012) *De la Police et du contrôle social.* Paris, Les éditions du CERF
- Mastrofski SD, Jonathan-Zamir D, Moyal S, Willis J (2016) Predicting procedural justice in police-citizen encounters. *Criminal Justice and Behav* 43(1):119–139

- Moore A, Berzofsky M, Banks D, Catalano S (2019) National Crime Victimization Survey Historical Trends Project, 1973–2014). Bureau of Justice Statistics (<https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/national-crime-victimization-survey-historical-trends-project-1973-2014>)
- Newburn T (2008) The future of policing. In: Newburn T (ed) Handbook of policing. Cullompton, Portland, Willan Publishing
- Pasqual JM (2011) Democratic governance of safety in cities. In Papers Rev Num 53:11–17
- Pina J, Brunton-Smith I (2021) Are we all equally persuaded by procedural justice? re-examining the invariance thesis using longitudinal data and random effects. J Developmental and Life-Course Criminol. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40865-021-00170-y>
- Scarpello F (2016) The partial turn to politics in plural policing studies. Contemporary Politics 22(1):114–123
- Shearing C, Wood J (2011) Pensar la seguridad. Gedisa, Barcelona
- Sampson RJ, Raudenbush SW (2004) Seeing disorder: neighborhood stigma and the social construction of broken windows. En Soc Psychol Quart 67(4):319–342(24)
- Taylor RB (1999) Incivilities thesis: theory, measurement and policy, a In: Langworthy RH (ed) Measuring what works: proceedings from the police research institute meeting, US Department of Justice. National Institute of Justice and Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, Washington DC, pp 65–88
- Tyler TR (1996) In: Why people obey the law. Princeton University Press
- Tyler TR (2003) Procedural justice, legitimacy and the effectiveness of law. En Crime and Justice 30:283–357
- Tyler TR (2011) Trust and legitimacy: policing in the USA and Europe. En Europ J Criminol 8(4):254–266
- Van Craen M (2016) Understanding Police officer's trust and trustworthy behavior: a work relations framework. En European J Criminol 13(2):274–294
- Van Soomeren P (2001) Prevenció de la delinqüència mitjançant el disseny ambiental i mitjançant l'espai urbà i arquitectònic. In: Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública. Núm vol 9. pp 11–37
- Wilson JQ, Kelling G (1982) Broken windows. In: The Atlantic monthly. March, pp 29–38
- Worden RE, McLean SJ (2018) Measuring, managing, and enhancing procedural justice in policing: promise and pitfalls. In Criminal Justice Policy Rev 29(2):149–171
- Zender L (2006) Policing before and after the police. the historical antecedents of contemporary crime control. En British J Criminol 46:78 a 96